will revolutionize medical treatment because scientists can potentially re-grow diseased cells, in contrast to the usual treatment of removing diseased cells via radiation or surgery. Id. at 19. Whether or not this benefit is ever realized, other significant benefits of stem cell research are certain according to Korobkin, including scientists' greater understanding of cell development and the creation of new sources of material for testing pharmaceuticals. Id. The authors argue convincingly that the governmental policies towards stem cell research ultimately undermine the United States' chances of realizing the full potential of stem cell research. See id. at 48 (discussing practical consequences of governmental policy towards stem cell research). applicable authority.' 2 Interesting issues include the constitutional right to clone embryos, the patent rights of stem cell researchers, and the informed consent of stem cell donors. 13 For each issue, the authors state the applicable fundamental principles of law, critique problems in application, and suggest solutions. Many times, obstacles result where existing law has fallen behind technological breakthroughs and the reality of medical science. In these instances, Korobkin's well-informed suggestions are useful.
Stem cell production requires fertilizing an egg with a sperm in a Petri dish and allowing the resulting zygote to divide until it has matured into a blastocyst, consisting of 150 -200 cells.
14 A blastocyst is made up of an outer layer of membrane and an inner cell mass ("ICM"), which contains human embryonic stem cells ("hESCs").15 Isolating the hESCs entails destroying the blastocyst and keeping the 1CM cells alive for a sufficient amount of time until they become an hESC line, which can provide viable hESCs. 16 In 1998, James Thompson of the University of Wisconsin successfully placed the extracted ICM into a nutrient mix and created a stable hESC line.'" The process, which requires killing the blastocyst, presents a moral dilemma for those that believe blastocysts are morally equal to human beings. On June 9, 2000, President George W. Bush stated that his administration viewed blastocysts as morally equal to human beings. 18 As a result, the Bush administration prohibited federal funding for research on hESC lines that were not already created. 19 The public's eye focuses on the biological, philosophical, policy and religious issues surrounding the position of the Bush administration, and the authors do a good job of explaining this issue for any interested reader. The book's true value, however, lies in the rich legal analysis of more practical and economical issues that plague stem cell research, which go largely unnoticed in today's media.
For example, Korobkin introduces legal analysis regarding the constitutionality 12 KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 5 (setting forth three interrelated goals to run through the book). 13 See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 5 (outlining chapters of the book). 14 of the federal government's attempt to ban the practice of cloning, which is an alternative way to create hESCs. There are creative arguments in support of cloning based on the commerce clause, the right to privacy, and the right of procreation. 20 Additionally, the authors address economic issues among researchers; such as the right to patent stem cell research methods and discoveries. This discussion concerns the intellectual property dispute between stem cell pioneers and subsequent researchers hoping to improve on initial discoveries without licensing restrictions. 21 Subsequently, the authors provide insight on the informed consent of stem cell donors while stressing the importance of honoring the autonomy of donors. 22 33 See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 11 (criticizing argument that blastocysts are equal to human beings). Korobkin states that the argument for blastocysts being equal to humans must rest either on the proposition that embryos are equal to humans because they share certain human characteristics or because they have the "potential" to be humans. Id. at 29. In refuting the first argument, Korobokin states that a five-day old blastocyst lacks every human characteristic other than DNA, and is not an individual because twinning remains possible. Id. at 30 -31. The second argument, though stronger, is equally unpersuasive because of the lack of a concrete definition of "potential." Id. at 33. One is that there is "potential" because an embryo Bush's position is contradictory because he makes an arbitrary distinction and wants to benefit from a supposed moral wrong. In allowing researchers to kill some embryosthose that existed before June 9, 2000-Bush recognized the value of stem cell research and wanted to benefit from it. 34 Yet, Bush undermined research efforts because he believes killing blastocysts is morally wrong. Thus, neither the researchers nor those protecting blastocysts are appeased, and society is deprived of the benefits of research.
35
In 2005, Congress also made an arbitrary distinction to pander to a constituency yet simultaneously recognized the benefits of stem cell research. 36 The failed Stem Cell
Research Enhancement Act would have allowed research on embryos that were left over from IVF clinics. 37 In making a distinction between "'discarded" embryos from IVF clinics and "created" embryos for the purpose of being destroyed, Korobkin believes Congress was contradictory in its statements. 38 Scientists create most embryos in IVF clinics fully knowing they will be destroyed, and thus denying stem cell researchers from doing the same was like "holding your finger in a dike while tsunami waves crash over has a high chance of becoming a human being (likelihood), and the other is that there is "potential" because an embryo might be able to grow into a human without external assistance (self-actualizability). Id. On either definition, according to Korobkin, the "potential" to become human is still very low, with the likelihood of a bout 20 -40%, and the complete lack of ability to become a person on its own without outside help. Korobkin best exemplifies the federal government's misunderstood and unreasonable aversion to stem cell research by describing the government's response to a breakthrough method of creating hESC lines that did not require the destruction of embryos.41
The method--which many researchers hoped would be met with governmental enthusiasm-required taking one of the eight cells of an embryo, leaving the other seven intact. 42 The governmental response was extremely negative. 43 Members of Congress attacked the method as morally wrong, and stated that sevencelled embryos were less healthy and an extracted cell had human potential. 44 In arguing that the opposition misses the point, Korobkin persuasively states "it is difficult to imagine how any scientific advance could ever soften the opposition to hESC research of President Bush and his allies."
45

A Constitutional Right to Clone
In chapter three, the authors take an interesting turn and discuss whether the government has the right to ban cloning under the Constitution. This exhaustive analysis cites the Commerce Clause, the right to pursue medical treatment, and reproductive rights.
46
Under the Commerce Clause, Korobkin predicts that the 39 KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 45. While the bill was unsuccessful, Korobkin states that Congress' attempt to allow for research on discarded embryos wh-ilc blatantly ignoring the superfluous amounts of embryos created in IVF clinics is pure hypocrisy. Id. 40 See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 48 -49 (discussing negative effects of Federal Government's policy on stem cell research). procreation is "basic civil right of man"). These cases, according to Korobkin, make it not inconceivable that the Supreme Court may recognize a constitutional right to make use of reproductive cloning for the purposes of procreation. KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 87. The two scholarly arguments against this would be one that aims to protect the health of the clones, and another to protect the rest of the society from the negative effects of cloning. Id. The first argument, that the government has a compelling interest in protecting potential children from substantial risk of being born with birth defects, is flawed because it assumes that a potential parent would resort to other means of reproduction is cloning were banned, which is
Economic Incentives for Researchers and Taxpayers
Chapter four, co-authored by Stephen R. Munzer, begins with an informative explanation of patent law that is valuable to anyone seeking a broad strokes understanding of the procedure and significance of patenting technological discoveries. The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF"), the first research group to create a viable hESC from a blastocyst, claims the legal right to prevent anyone from using hESC technology created by any method. 60 The breadth of this patent, as the authors explain, is destructive to the advancement of stem cell research because it creates financial burdens that may inhibit research. Korobkin argues that the transactions costs that go along with obtaining protected information can ultimately be detrimental to research, and therefore California should not have simply assumed that mirroring the Bayh-Dole Act was the best approach. Id. 74 See id. at 134-135 (arguing lopsided approach gives too much leverage to private inventors, public must be considered as well). 75 KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 135. Korobkin argues that we should draw the line based on how expensive a product will cost to patent, which affects how much people are willing to invest in the development of the product so that it is ultimately commercially viable. Id. "Research tool" products, such as the specific hESC lines that WARF patents, are useful with little or no further investment needed for development. Id. at 136. "Applied Products," however, are substantially more expensive to develop, requiring large amounts of money and time before they produce a financial return." Id. According to Korobkin, the risk and money of developing an "applied" product is on a private corporation, and thus they should be rewarded with a patent. Id. Thus, society is benefited from allowing less patent rights for "research tool" inventions and more patent rights for "applied" inventions. Id. at 137. 76 See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 140 (criticizing CIRM for allowing researchers to place their own interest over the public's interest). Korobkin suggests a number of revenuesharing alternative agreements such as providing in-kind revenue sharing as opposed to solely cash compensation. Id. at 150. 77 KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 150. Korobkin states that CIRM, in allowing grantees the choice to patent their inventions or not, has made a big mistake. Id. In some cases, a grantee's monetary incentive to patent a research tool invention will deprive the public. Id.
Autonomy and Financial Rights of Donors
Chapter six addresses the autonomy and informed consent of donors with respect to health risks and the disclosure of researchers' financial interests. Under "the common rule," researchers must apprise donors of all risks and obtain informed consent before taking samples from donors. 78 In stem cell research, however, a majority of research is privately funded and thus researchers are not under the legal obligations of the common rule. 79 Korobkin asks whether private research is under a separate tort obligation to obtain the informed consent of human tissue donors-a duty not imposed on most recipients of goods or services. 80 There is little authority to support such an obligation, but the author believes in honoring the autonomy of donors, and therefore erring on the side of informed consent.
81
A separate issue is whether the researcher must disclose his or her financial interest prior to obtaining informed consent. 82 In Recent authority states, however, that nontherapeutic research settings, like stem cell research, do not require disclosure of financial interests. 85 The Greenbeqg court justified this position when ruling on a nontherapeutic donor's voluntary choice to supply tissue and the negative effects that disclosure would have on research. 86 Korbokin fiercely disagrees with this position and cites materiality as the sole factor for disclosure and states that the commercial interest of researchers is material. 87 The author supports the autonomy of donors over access to embryos that may otherwise go unused and argues for researcher's use of tissue only with express informed consent. 88 This chapter seems to go against the progressive theme of the book because Korobkin wishes to assume autonomy does not exist if it is not express. This position may ultimately inhibit research based on a requirement that, in many situations, could be arbitrary and unnecessary. The requirement could create the type of bureaucracy and procedural requirements that would exclude large amounts of viable donated embryos when the donor can no longer be reached for express consent.
On a related topic in chapter seven, Korobkin asks whether it is proper for 84 See 793 P.2d at 485 (requiring disclosure of financial interests). Korobkin states the Moore decision is not squarely on point with whether researchers conducting non-therapeutic research without direct contact with the subject because the facts in Moore contained a therapeutic or direct relationship between subject and researcher. KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 161-162. 85 See Greenbe, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-1071 (holding no requirement for non-therapeutic researchers to disclose financial interests). 86 KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 162. Korobkin believes that the Greenber case is directly on point because it involved a researcher without a therapeutic relationship with the donors. Id. In Greenberg, however, the court distinguished non-therapeutic donors as distinct from subjects because they voluntarily donated, stating that disclosure of financial interests would "chill" research, and holding that disclosure of financial interests was not required. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d. at 1070-1071. 87 See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 162 -163 (arguing against reasoning in Greenberg).
Korobkin states that disclosure of financial interest would not chill medical research unless subjects had a moral opposition to donating tissues to researchers that seek profits, and while it is unlikely, if it were true it would undermine the concept of informed consent. Id. For the second justification, Korobkin believes that non-therapeutic donors must have more information to decide if the researcher's interests are truly for the benefit of society. Id. 88 See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 165 (arguing for disclosure of financial interests to non-therapeutic voluntary cell donors); see id. at 168-169 (arguing informed consent should be required prior to using unidentified samples provided for non-stem cell use); see id. at 170 (arguing blanket consent prior to donating tissues not truly informed and thus could not suffice); see id. at 172-173 (arguing that informed consent from both spouses is required prior to research on dually donated embryos).
researchers to give monetary or in kind compensation for the donation of blastocysts or embryos. Currently, many stem cell research guidelines and state laws are strictly against compensation for tissue donation for stem cell research. 89 Legally, the statutes on point are the National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA") and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"), which are facially against compensation.
90
Korobkin notes the ambiguity of the statutes regarding donation and attacks the policy of no-compensation rules. 91 His position is that we should allow compensation for donors as long as there is sufficient informed consent.
92
A popular anti-compensation argument states that compensation will increase involuntary and coerced donations mainly among lowincome sectors of the economy, and we risk ignoring the needs of the less fortunate. induce more low-income donors, our capitalistic society allows for many situations where the poor must undertake dangerous and unpleasant professions that the wealthy might object to. 95 The chapter ultimately concludes that compensation could suit the needs of researchers and donors alike, while staying consistent with no-compensation justifications for transplants set forth in NOTA and the UAGA. 96
In chapter eight, Korobkin examines potential default rules for tissue donation in light of Moore and other authority. In Moore, the court denied a claim for conversion based on the defendant's financial benefit from undisclosed research on the plaintiff's spleen. 97 In Greenberg, the court had the opportunity to clarify this issue, but only produced more confusion.
1 0 2 Thus, with scant legal authority, Korobkin opts for a weak nocompensation default rule, which would allow courts to liberally interpret the intentions of a donor in favor of compensation.' 0 3 Korobkin's thorough and thoughtful analysis of current law implies confusion on the part of courts and scholars alike, which pushes the reader towards his sensible and informed solution.
In Thus, if scientists were only using embryos to save Molly's life and not to create a new human being, the practice would be morally wrong and illegal. Korobkin argues this strict Kantian analysis-that one person should not be used solely to benefit another-is inapplicable to curing diseases in children. 1 0 9 According to Korobkin, a utilitarian cost-benefits analysis about the happiness of the child and family as a whole is more appropriate.10 The chapter then moves to the FDA's long and arduous pre-approval procedure, which Korobkin finds to be outdated as applied to stem cell research."'
Conclusion
Korobkin's method of identifying and resolving potential problem areas for stem cell research is clever and frequently convincing. First, he identifies how our current system may prohibit society from realizing the benefits of stem cell research. Next, he proposes a solution of compromise between parties that also furthers his prostem cell research position. Furthermore, he uses the unique factors of stem cell research to narrow the breadth of potential legal obstacles. When Korobkin respectfully-and frequently unsuccessfully-attempts to extract legal principles, the reader forms his or her own conclusions that parallel Korobkin's proposals. This is difficult because it is hard to accept the application of authority to a factual situation that lawmakers never contemplated. As the book portrays, lawmakers that created authority 
. Kant stated that a human life is an end in itself, and thus using a human life as a means to an end is always immoral. Id. The HFEA seems to take this approach with PGD, in that developing an embryo for PGD is only permissible if doing so helps the embryo develop into a healthy human being. See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 237 (arguing against Kantian analysis for regulation of PGD). Specifically, Korobkin makes two points about the Kantian analysis; the first is that even acceptable PGD entails killing embryos with diseases, and thus the distinction is contradictory. Id. at 237-238. The second is that the good health of the living child and the family unit should be considered as well, not just whether the embryo is used as a means or an end. Id.
110 KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 237.
111
See KOROBKIN WITH MUNZER, supra note 1, at 242-245 (explaining current FDA pre-market approval process). The current process entails several steps to show the safety and efficacy of a product of biological products, and takes seven and a half years on average. Id. at 244. Furthermore, the process is very expensive and thus creates two bad consequences: patients are deprived of timely treatment and manufacturers must cover their risk with higher prices. Id. A third problem is that manufacturers have an incentive to create widely marketable products, which usually means drugs and treatments must be continually prescribed. Id. All of these consequences are at odds with the goals of stem cell research; there are unknown risks, many patients cannot wait for approval, and it will not be widely marketable like traditional drugs and treatments. Id. For these reasons, Korobkin argues we need a different system of approval to account for the unpredictable risks of stem cell research, but simultaneously allow for timely treatment when necessary. Id. at 246.
which is now applicable to stem cell research did not contemplate stem cell research, and thus there is need for change.
Stem Cell Century attempts to answer questions that are arguably unanswerable, however, the ultimate message is clear: Society will benefit from more stem cell research. On each step of the way, Korobkin explains how the status quo may hinder stem cell research and argues against such a result. In suggesting solutions, Korobkin recognizes a void in stem cell-informed legal authority, and respects the capriciousness of this breakthrough technology. On March 9, 2009, President Barack Obama signed an executive order that granted federal funding for stem cell research.
1 12 This is a step in the right direction for stem cell research and supporters, however, as Stem Cell Centuy explains, it is not a solution to the myriad of obstacles society faces in realizing the benefits of stem cell research. 
